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State’s Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights 
GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES∗ & LUIS FUENTES-ROHWER** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,1 the United States Supreme 
Court struck down Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the 
provision that identified the jurisdictions required to obtain federal 
preclearance, under Section 5 of the Act, for any policy changes related to 
voting.2 Though the Court did not strike down Section 5,3 the Court has 
effectively declared an end to the Section 4-Section 5 coverage-
preclearance tandem that had been in place since the Act’s enactment in 
1965. 
The Court’s decision in Shelby County did not come as a surprise to 
voting rights experts. Four years prior to Shelby County, in Northwest 
Austin Municipal District Number One v. Holder (Northwest Austin),4 the 
Court threatened to strike down Section 5 as unconstitutional.5 Though the 
Court ultimately decided Northwest Austin on statutory grounds, it was 
abundantly clear then that a majority of Justices were hostile to important 
provisions of the Act and that the Act was living on borrowed time.6  
What was surprising about Shelby County was the nature of the Court’s 
legal analysis. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court’s conservative 
majority vacillated between Section 5 and Section 4 before settling on 
Section 4 as the problem.7 Most surprisingly, the Court did not hang its hat 
on a federalism rationale, but instead it focused on the failure of Congress 
to treat the states with equal dignity.8 This principle of equal dignity, 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Charles S. Rhyne Professor of Law, Duke Law School. 
** Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Fellow, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Many 
thanks to Joseph Blocher, Dan Conkle, James Gardner, Richard Hasen, Samuel Issacharoff, Magaret 
Lemos, and Richard Pildes for their terrific comments on previous drafts. Thanks also to colleagues at 
SUNY Buffalo School of Law whose careful attention to our ideas improved the work immeasurably.   
1 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
2 Id. at 2631. 
3 Id. at 2618, 2631. 
4 557 U.S. 193 (2009).  
5 See id. at 202 (noting that Section 5 exceeds the prohibition of the Fifteenth Amendment). 
6 See id. at 202–03 (noting that improvements to the Act were insufficient to justify such features 
as the preclearance requirement and that the Act needed to be modified to accommodate current 
societal needs).  
7 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627–28, 2631 (deciding that only the coverage formula found in 
Section 4 is unconstitutional, not Section 5). 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 242. 
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though mentioned in Northwest Austin, was explicitly rejected in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach,9 the landmark voting rights case, yet resurrected 
to justify the Court’s decision in Shelby County.10  
Reading the opinion optimistically, Shelby County could have been 
worse, a lot worse. It is possible to read Shelby County as a narrow and 
arguably minimalist opinion. For example, though the Court struck down 
Section 4’s coverage formula, it did not deem Section 5 and the 
preclearance requirement unconstitutional.11 Moreover, the opinion does 
not have any obvious bearing on Section 2 of the VRA.12 Notwithstanding 
the Court’s conclusion that the particular coverage formula employed by 
the VRA was unconstitutional, the Court did not express any constitutional 
opposition to coverage formulas per se and just focused on this one, which 
it did not find justifiable on current facts.13 This leaves open the possibility 
that an updated formula would pass constitutional scrutiny. 
Additionally, while the opinion is less than pellucid with respect to the 
standard of review that the Court employed to evaluate an act of Congress, 
there is a good case to be made that the standard of review is unsettled and 
left to be decided for another day. Better yet, one can argue that the Court 
applied rational basis review, admittedly with some bite, and that the Act 
failed rational basis review because Congress failed to do any updating.14 
Consequently, under this reasoning, a new coverage formula should easily 
pass rational basis review, even a rational basis standard that is applied 
with some bite.15  
Further, to the extent that the decision was motivated by what the 
Court viewed as political avoidance on the part of Congress—the failure of 
that body to update the VRA because it refused to bear the political costs 
of doing so16—one could view Shelby County as not reflecting hostility to 
the VRA itself but as communicating a message to Congress about the 
perils of political avoidance. Relatedly, if we had a functioning Congress, 
                                                                                                                          
9 See 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966) (“The doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South 
Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are 
admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”) 
(citation omitted). 
10 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620. 
11 Id. at 2631 (emphasizing that the Court did not issue any opinion on Section 5 itself).  
12 In fact, the Court took pains to underscore by the end of its opinion that its “decision in no way 
affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in § 2.” Id.  
13 Id. at 2629–30. 
14 See, e.g., id. at 2630–31 (“If Congress had started from scratch in 2006, . . . . It would have 
been irrational for Congress to distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-year-
old data . . . .”). 
15 See, e.g., id. at 2631 (“Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions.”). 
16 See Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory and the VRA, 117 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 148, 153 (2007), available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/political-avoidance-
constitutional-theory-and-the-vra (noting that Congress has not renewed the VRA since 1982). 
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one that could respond as an institution to the Court’s invitation to update 
the Act, one might view Shelby County as dialogic. On this reading, Shelby 
County would be contributing to the furtherance of voting rights policy by 
providing Congress an incentive to act and to amend the VRA to reflect 
twenty-first century concerns.   
This narrow and minimalist interpretation of the case is plausible, 
though, perhaps much too optimistic.17 The departing premise of this 
optimistic read of Shelby County is that the Court essentially left intact the 
basic infrastructure of its voting rights jurisprudence. But what if, instead, 
the Court unsettled the fundamental premises of its voting rights 
jurisprudence? If Shelby County signals the need for a complete reset on 
the approach to voting rights that has been in effect for the latter half of the 
twentieth century, what then is the import for voting rights reform and 
jurisprudence going forward? 
Consider instead a less optimistic reading of Shelby County, one that 
views the Court’s decision as deeply destabilizing to the infrastructure of 
voting rights law and policy. Such a reading construes Shelby County as a 
radical departure from past precedent, particularly from South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach.18 More specifically, we understand modern voting rights law, 
policy, and jurisprudence—that is, voting rights law, policy, and 
jurisprudence since 1965—as based upon a number of foundational and 
basic assumptions. Three are absolutely critical. First, the Court has 
generally granted primacy to the federal government over the states with 
respect to the authority to regulate elections.19 Federal regulation, 
particularly at the intersection of race and voting, displaced conflicting 
state regulation.20 
Second, the Court has accorded Congress a fair amount of deference 
and leeway, particularly when Congress attempts to address the problem of 
racial discrimination in democratic politics.21 When Congress has regulated 
at the intersection of race and voting, the Court has generally provided 
                                                                                                                          
17 For a similar assessment of the case, see Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of 
Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 714 (2014). 
18 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (holding that sections of the VRA 
that South Carolina challenged are constitutional).  
19 See id. at 334 (acknowledging that the Act deviates from traditional congressional action, but 
that such deviation is deemed appropriate in certain circumstances); see also Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 
2624 (noting that the Court had upheld the Act permitting Congress to depart from traditional 
governmental principles in the past).  
20 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (commenting that the Fifteenth Amendment gives 
Congress the power to identify and change laws in jurisdictions that abridge one’s right to vote because 
of his or her race).  
21 See id. at 2646–47 (citing United States v. McGregor, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1344–48 (M.D. 
Ala. 2011)) (noting that case law illustrates the prevalence of racism in state politics).  
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Congress a fair amount of deference as to its choice of means.22 And third, 
the Court, Congress, and the Executive Branch have generally operated 
from a similar and fluid conception of racial discrimination. All three 
branches agreed that racial discrimination was a significant problem to be 
addressed and all three have had the same general understanding of racial 
discrimination, at least as a point of departure: intentional discrimination 
by state actors.23 But more importantly, the Court has permitted Congress 
to define and regulate discrimination broader than just intentional 
discrimination, such as vote dilution or racial disparate impact, in large 
part because of the need to eradicate intentional racial discrimination in 
voting.24 
When the Court held that Section 4(b) was unconstitutional in Shelby 
County, it did not simply strike down a key provision of the VRA. Far 
more importantly, it also questioned these key assumptions that 
undergirded modern voting rights law and policy. Shelby County portends 
a realignment in voting rights law and policy. 
Voting rights policy, law, and jurisprudence must now pivot from 
Shelby County. As a consequence there is much at stake in properly 
interpreting the case. The voting rights bar must use Shelby County not just 
to anticipate as accurately as possible the Court’s next move, but also to 
think about where voting rights law and policy are likely to go. To some, 
voting rights policy ought to severely break with the approach of the past, 
while others argue that voting rights policy should adopt a “mend-it, don’t 
end-it” approach by continuing the race-based and centralized regulatory 
structure to protecting voting rights.25 Voting rights activists are currently 
and urgently pressing the race-based approach against a structural 
                                                                                                                          
22 See, e.g., Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (holding, inter alia, that the Fifteenth Amendment allows 
Congress to “use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination 
in voting”). 
23 See The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, h (banning tools that states used to 
intentionally discriminate against minority voters, such as literacy tests and poll taxes); Nw. Austin 
Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 225 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[T]he constitutionality of § 5 has always depended on the proven existence of 
intentional discrimination so extensive that elimination of it through case-by-case enforcement would 
be impossible.”). 
24 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has long 
recognized that vote dilution, when adopted with a discriminatory purpose, cuts down the right to vote 
as certainly as denial of access to the ballot.”) (citations omitted). 
25 On the centralized regulatory framework of the VRA see, for example, Guy-Uriel E. Charles & 
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County Contingency Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
131, 132 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1172_7tf1ew4q.pdf and Samuel Issacharoff, 
Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 116 (2013) (describing the 
“command-and-control” regulatory model of the VRA).  
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rethinking of voting rights law, policy, and jurisprudence.26 In particular, 
voting rights activists are urgently lobbying in favor of a revised race-
based and centralized coverage formula as a Shelby County fix that would 
essentially reinstate the coverage-preclearance tandem.27 The preference 
for a race-based approach is driven by the belief that race continues to be 
the primary problem in voting. The preference for a centralized approach is 
supported by the belief that what we have called elsewhere the “public 
protection model” is the most effective way of conducting voting rights 
policy.28 
Coming to terms with the meaning and scope of Shelby County is thus 
important for at least three reasons. First, the constitutional viability of a 
legislative response to Shelby County will depend in part on the scope of 
Shelby County. A race-based revised coverage formula that reinstates the 
coverage-preclearance tandem assumes that Shelby County is a narrow, 
minimalist opinion that did not disturb the fundamental underpinnings of 
modern voting rights jurisprudence. If the narrow reading of Shelby County 
is correct, a race-based formula that essentially updates the old coverage 
formula should easily pass constitutional scrutiny. But to the extent that 
Shelby County conveys a deeper hostility to the regulatory logic of the 
VRA and to the extent that Shelby County has undermined the 
jurisprudential infrastructure that once sustained the VRA, such an 
approach is not likely to be successful.  
Second, the Court’s decision in Shelby County may be significant 
because it reflects a broader trend away from the dominant civil rights 
model. That is, Shelby County may be reflecting or anticipating a trend 
away from a race-based and centralized regulatory structure and towards 
something else. To the extent that Shelby County portends a move away 
from the centralized public protection model—that is, to the extent that the 
conservatives on the Court have anticipated or are reflecting an erosion of 
support in the political process for the current regulatory framework—
voting rights activists would be wise to focus their efforts more on the 
future and less on the past.  
                                                                                                                          
26 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After 
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2838 (2014) (describing legislative responses proposed by voting rights 
activists). 
27 This is precisely what the recent Amendment to the VRA does. See Voting Rights Amendment 
Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. § 3(b)(3) (2014) (providing, inter alia, standards for determining 
whether local or state governmental actions violate a citizen’s voting rights on racial grounds); see also 
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2838 (describing legislative responses proposed by voting rights activists). 
28 See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County Contingency Strategy, supra 
note 25, at 132 (“The twenty-first century presents voting rights activists and scholars with two 
different frameworks for securing and protecting voting rights. The first framework is essentially the 
centralized regulatory structure that is quite familiar to voting rights activists and scholars. For ease of 
explanation, we term this framework ‘the public protection model.’ Under this model, Congress 
identifies both violators and violations.”). 
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Third, even if Shelby County does not impose significant constitutional 
constraints on future policy proposals and even if Shelby County does not 
reflect a broader political zeitgeist toward a different regulatory structure 
for voting rights policy, Shelby County might tilt the policy space against 
the current regulatory framework.29 Thus, public policy options that were 
on the wall before Shelby County are now off the wall after Shelby County.  
Put a different way: a race-based Shelby County fix will most likely 
depend upon a broader definition of racial discrimination than is consistent 
with a reasonable reading of Shelby County, something broader than 
intentional discrimination.30 Such a fix will also depend on a robust 
conception of congressional power as against the states to enforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments so as to prohibit racial discrimination in 
voting, as well as an assumption that the Court will generously defer to 
Congress’s factual determinations. This is a tall order. If the voting rights 
bar bets wrongly on the meaning of Shelby County—that is, if Shelby 
County is more disruptive than most voting rights activists assume—a 
race-based approach that attempts to reinstate the coverage-preclearance 
arrangement is not only likely to be struck down, but it will also jeopardize 
other VRA provisions that are currently constitutional such as Section 2 
and Section 5. 
In this Article, we present the case against an optimistic reading of 
Shelby County. Part II argues that the Court in Shelby County has declared 
that systematic racial discrimination—what we term the “Era of Big 
Racism”—is no longer a significant problem in voting. Part III maintains 
that the Court has also indicated that it will no longer defer to Congress on 
voting rights policy. Part IV shows that the telos of Shelby County is the 
redemption of the South and the states from the past.31 Consequently, as 
long as the current majority controls the Court, any future regulation that 
depends upon systematic racial discrimination as justification, 
distinguishes among the states, and attempts to make Congress the 
                                                                                                                          
29 An apt example is the Court’s decision in Beer v. United States, in which the Court held that 
Section 5 of the VRA is violated only when a covered jurisdiction makes voters of color worse off. 
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140–41 (1976). It is not violated when a covered jurisdiction does 
not make voters of color better off. Id. For a long time, both the liberals on the Court and, more 
importantly, the voting rights community have deplored the Beer decision. Id. However, Beer has 
become such an integral fabric of voting rights law and policy that the voting rights bar sought to 
enshrine the Beer standard in the VRAA. Id. 
30 In fact, the recent amendment to the Voting Rights Act, proposed by Representatives Jim 
Sensenbrenner and John Conyers in the House and Patrick Leahy in the Senate, does just that. It defines 
discrimination to include vote dilution, objection letters by the Department of Justice, and intentional 
discrimination. H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 1945, 113th Cong. (2014).  
31 Prior to the Court’s decision in Shelby County but after oral arguments in the case, Professor 
Joseph Fishkin advanced a very thoughtful argument along similar lines. See Joseph Fishkin, The 
Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 175–76 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal. 
org/pdf/1174_iyst6fvo.pdf (discussing the concept of equal dignity afforded to states and its centrality 
to the issues presented before the Court in Shelby County, as well as the concept’s philosophical roots). 
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guarantor of voting rights for voters of color over the states will be 
constitutionally suspect. By way of a conclusion, we consider the future of 
voting rights policy under a future Supreme Court that would be more 
receptive to the use of race in public policy. 
II.  THE END OF BIG RACISM? (IN VOTING?) 
The voting rights bar is in the midst of two interrelated debates. The 
first is whether race continues to be a significant problem in voting. The 
second concerns whether voting rights policy going forward ought to be 
race-based or universalist. Most voting rights activists are currently urging 
a race-based approach that updates the coverage formula and reinstates the 
coverage-preclearance regime that the Court undermined in Shelby County. 
They view racial discrimination as an enduring and central problem in 
voting.   
As with the voting rights bar, voting rights scholars are also in the 
midst of a debate with respect to the continued relevance of race and the 
proper response to Shelby County. Professor Rick Pildes began this debate 
years ago when he argued that “the narrow targeting model of Section 5 – 
its effort to single out particular areas and changes in voting rules – is less 
well suited to the voting rights problems of today than was the original 
Section 5 to the voting-rights problems of its day.”32 Professor Samuel 
Issacharoff has similarly argued against a race-based approach on the 
ground that “current voting controversies, unlike the concerns of racial 
exclusion under Jim Crow, are likely motivated by partisan zeal and 
emerge in contested partisan environments.”33 In a related vein, Professor 
Richard Hasen has argued that current voting rights controversies are about 
both race and party.34 Consequently, courts should move “beyond race or 
party” to force state actors to justify voting laws “discriminating against a 
party’s voters or otherwise burdening voters.”35 
In a recent article, Professor Spencer Overton has pushed back against 
the universalist approach. Though he acknowledges that “race relations 
have improved dramatically in the past fifty years, discounting the need to 
prevent racial discrimination is a mistake.”36 In his view, “[r]ather than 
abandon preclearance, Congress should update preclearance by tying 
coverage to areas with recent voting rights violations.”37   
                                                                                                                          
32 Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right 
to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741, 752 (2006). 
33 Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 100. 
34 Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to 
Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 1 (2013).  
35 Id. at 13–14. 
36 Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 19, 21 (2013). 
37 Id. at 20. 
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The most extensive and comprehensive case against the universalist 
approach has been made by Professor Samuel Bagenstos.38 Professor 
Bagenstos has characterized the claims in favor of a universal approach to 
voting rights into two categories, substantive and tactical. The substantive 
category is whether a race-based approach or a universal approach is best 
for addressing current voting rights problems. Professor Bagenstos argues, 
contra Professors Issacharoff and Hasen, that the universal approach is 
misguided because it would “leave a lot of significant discrimination 
against black and Latino voters unremedied. That is because a great deal of 
that discrimination involves vote dilution, not vote denial, and it takes 
place at the county and local, not state, level.”39   
The tactical category refers to whether there are non-substantive 
justifications for preferring one approach to the other. In particular, 
Professor Bagenstos characterizes as tactical the argument that voting 
rights activists should adopt a universalist model because the Court is not 
likely to be receptive to a race-based approach. He concludes, “the tactical 
arguments for the universalist position are likely overblown.”40 
To be fair, most of this debate is occurring purely on important 
substantive and policy grounds, viz., whether voting rights policy is better 
served by a universalist approach than a race-based or particularlist one. 
But the policy options available in the short or long-term are realistically 
constrained by the constitutional framework. Thus, whether the tactical 
case for the universalist position is overblown or not and whether claims of 
vote dilution would count, or continue to count, as racial discrimination 
depends upon the constraints of Shelby County. An important question for 
voting rights activists who are crafting a response to Shelby County is 
determining whether Shelby County is a minimalist decision or whether it 
fundamentally alters our basic assumptions about the Court’s voting rights 
jurisprudence. Judging by the early reaction to the decision, many in the 
voting rights community, not surprisingly, seem attracted to a narrow read 
of Shelby County. 
As we noted at the outset, Shelby County can be read as a minimalist 
opinion. For one, the Court only struck down Section 4(b) of the Act, the 
coverage formula, and only because of what it viewed as changed 
circumstances.41 This means, and the Court took pains to underscore, that 
Section 2 of the Act, its permanent, nationwide provision, remains 
                                                                                                                          
38 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After 
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838 (2014). 
39 Id. at 36. By vote denial, Bagestos means “actions . . . [such as] altering electoral districts, 
moving from district-based to at-large elections, changing election dates, and so forth . . . that dilute the 
voting strength of growing black and Latino communities.” Id. 
40 Id. at 39. 
41 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2617 (2013). 
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unaffected, as does Section 5, the preclearance requirement.42 Furthermore, 
one could read the Court’s decision as not reflecting hostility to the VRA’s 
regulatory structure, but mainly as a message to Congress for failing to 
update the Act because Congress feared a political backlash.43 Recall also 
the majority’s annoyance that Congress not only failed to narrow the VRA, 
but it also expanded the scope of the Act when it renewed Section 5 in 
2006.44 If Shelby County prompts Congress to enact a modern statute, one 
might even regard the opinion as salutary. On this reading, Shelby County 
would be contributing to the furtherance of voting rights policy by 
providing Congress an incentive to act. 
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts positioned Shelby County as a direct 
descendant of South Carolina v. Katzenbach.45 In South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, the Court adopted a rationality test and concluded that the 
coverage formula was “rational in both practice and theory.”46 Congress 
designed the formula to target the most egregious states and the formula 
performed as intended. Congress’s formula only needed to be rational. This 
is, arguably, the same test that the Court purported to use in Shelby 
County.47 The cases come out differently only because Congress did not 
justify its extension of the formula with new evidence.48 The voting and 
registration disparities that undergirded the original formula no longer 
exist, and though “the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, . . . the 
Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.”49 In other words, the 
Court is not breaking new ground with Shelby County; it is simply situating 
new facts within established legal doctrine. Relatedly, the Court 
acknowledged that “[s]triking down an Act of Congress ‘is the gravest and 
most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.’”50 And thus, 
                                                                                                                          
42  See id. at 2631 (“Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial 
discrimination in voting found in § 2. We issue no holding on § 5 itself, only the coverage formula.”). 
43 Pildes, Political Avoidance, supra note 16, at 148. 
44 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626–27. 
45 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); see Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624–25 
(discussing how the prevalence of racially discriminatory voting policies in covered jurisdictions has 
lessened since the Court’s decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach). 
46 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 330. 
47 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624−25. (describing the test as rational for the circumstances in 
the past and that a rational test will be used for the circumstances of present). 
48 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (discussing the 
fact that the coverage formula is based on old data); id. at 226 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (explaining that evidence of discrimination, which previously caused Congress to 
uphold Section 5, no longer exists and that the lack of this evidence undermines the basis for retaining 
it); Jenigh J. Garrett, The Continued Need for the Voting Rights Act: Examining Second-Generation 
Discrimination, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 78 (2010) (explaining that both the majority and 
dissent in Northwest Austin expressed, in dicta, constitutional concerns with the reauthorization of the 
Act and the record which supported the reauthorization of the Act).  
49 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628. 
50 Id. at 2631 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)). 
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when the Court does so, it does so as a matter of last resort. From this 
perspective, Shelby County is a minimalist decision because the Court was 
forced to intervene surgically when Congress reauthorized a statute that 
was not rational in theory or in practice. 
But this is not the only way to interpret the decision. Shelby County 
has reopened long running debates in election law, debates that were 
temporized in the post-VRA period. Consider first the question of racial 
discrimination. The telos of modern voting rights law, policy, and 
jurisprudence has been the importance of eradicating any trace of racial 
discrimination in voting.51 This consensus was the fulcrum for voting 
rights policy and framed the Court’s approach to the Act, as well as its 
approach to Congress.52  
When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into 
law on August 6, 1965, he called it “one of the most monumental laws in 
the entire history of American freedom.”53 Coming on the heels of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, this was high praise from the President. But it 
was not hyperbolic. Writing in 1959, the United States Commission on 
Civil Rights emphatically declared, “qualified Americans are, because of 
their race or color, being denied their right to vote.”54 This was not a 
controversial conclusion. Within six years of the Commission’s report, 
President Johnson addressed the nation and explained that “the harsh fact 
is that in many places in this country men and women are kept from voting 
simply because they are Negroes.”55  
The Court accepted this view the following year in South Carolina v. 
                                                                                                                          
51 See, e.g., id. at 2618 (describing how Congress’s approach was strong but necessary to address 
the evils of racism); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 557 U.S. at 205 (“Congress amassed a 
sizeable record in support of its decision to extend the preclearance requirements, a record the District 
Court determined ‘document[ed] contemporary racial discrimination in covered states.’ . . . The District 
Court also found that the record ‘demonstrat[ed] that section 5 prevents discriminatory voting changes’ 
by ‘quietly but effectively deterring discriminatory changes.’”) (citations omitted). 
52 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619 (stating that the Court would look at both 
constitutional issues and the current needs of society in analyzing the Act’s measures); Nw. Austin 
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 557 U.S. at 201–05 (discussing the successes of VRA with respect to 
eliminating certain racial disparities in voting and analyzing Congress’s aims in this vein); Bartlett v. 
Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (“Still, racial discrimination and racially polarized voting are not 
ancient history. Much remains to be done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity to 
share and participate in our democratic processes and traditions; and § 2 must be interpreted to ensure 
that continued progress.”). 
53 John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Lyndon B. Johnson: Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the 
Signing of the Voting Rights Act, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 6, 1965), www.presidency.ucsb 
.edu/ws/?pid=27140. 
54 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, 1959 107 (1959). 
55 LYNDON B. JOHNSON, RIGHT TO VOTE: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES RELATIVE TO THE RIGHT TO VOTE, H.R. DOC. NO. 117, at 2 (1965).  
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Katzenbach.56 A cursory reading of South Carolina v. Katzenbach makes 
clear that the historical backdrop of systemic and pervasive discrimination 
framed the Supreme Court’s response. For the Court, evidence of pervasive 
discrimination was readily available on the television set. Of particular 
interest to us is the way that the Supreme Court in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach understood and summarized the “voluminous” congressional 
record and, particularly, the majority reports.57 The Court first offered the 
history of voter suppression in the late nineteenth century and the many 
legal challenges that followed.58 This history culminated in the first civil 
rights statutes since the Reconstruction Era, none of which had the desired 
effect. Case-by-case litigation proved ineffective, for reasons of both time 
and effort.59 Litigation was expensive, cases required a lot of time to 
prepare and carry out through litigation, and, once a judgment was secured, 
the affected jurisdictions could then enact new laws in order to evade 
enforcement.60  
The ultimate proof of racial discrimination was found in the numbers. 
Voter registration rates had only inched forward since the mid-1950s. For 
example, voter registration rates in Louisiana between 1956 and 1965 
increased from 31.7% to 31.8%; in Mississippi, from 4.4% to 6.4% 
between 1954 and 1964; and in Alabama, from 14.2% to 19.4% between 
1958 and 1964.61 Most importantly, white registration rates in these 
jurisdictions “ran roughly 50 percentage points or more ahead of Negro 
registration.”62 For a telling example, the Court offered the litigation in 
Selma, Alabama, sitting in Dallas County with approximately 15,000 
voting-age blacks.63 After four years of litigation and great expense, and 
even after two federal courts had found “widespread” discrimination in 
voting, black voter registration only rose from 156 to 383.64 
In his opening statement before the Judiciary Committee, Attorney 
General Katzenbach relied on these figures for support of the proposed 
voting rights bill. As he told the Committee, “[c]urrent voter registration 
statistics demonstrate that comprehensive implementing legislation is 
                                                                                                                          
56 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (“Congress felt itself confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil 
which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance 
of the Constitution.”). 
57 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. 
58 See id. at 310–13 (detailing the history and legal challenges of voter suppression in the late 
nineteenth century).  
59 Id. at 314.  
60 Id. (noting that when plaintiffs brought suits against local governments for VRA violations and 
received favorable judgments, the local governments who lost such cases would merely switch to 
various other discriminatory devices that were not addressed by the VRA’s requirements).  
61 Id. at 313. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 314–15. 
64 Id.  
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esential [sic] to make the 15th amendment work.”65 He offered the figures 
in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and the example of Dallas County, 
where, “[a]fter 4 years of litigation, only 383 Negroes are registered to 
vote.”66 These figures, he later explained, “are indicative of a probability of 
racial discrimination within those areas in violation of the 15th 
amendment.”67 
Critics of the Act disagreed with this characterization. For example, 
Senator Ervin asked, in reference to the coverage formula, “do you not 
think that the fact that less than 50 percent of the people vote or even the 
fact that less than 50 percent of the people of voting age register may be 
reasonably explained on grounds other than discrimination?”68 One 
common answer was simply voter apathy.69 More forcefully, Judge 
Leander Perez, representing Louisiana Governor McKeithen, explained the 
figures as follows: 
I think it is just a low type of citizenship. They do not have 
the ambition, they do not have the urge, they do not know 
enough about government, they do not care . . . . You are 
willing to take statistics and fabricated statistics that do not 
show the true facts.70 
The constitutionality of the Act thus hinged on how the Court would 
understand these data points and the record put together by Congress. In 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court agreed with the government’s 
reading of the facts.71 In the Court’s words, “[t]he constitutional propriety 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the 
historical experience which it reflects.”72 This experience reflected an 
encounter with “an insidious and pervasive evil which had been 
perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and 
ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”73 Thus, though the Court remarked 
that in promulgating certain statutory provisions of the VRA, “Congress 
                                                                                                                          
65 Voting Rights: Hearing on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 9 (1965) 
(statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the U.S.). 
66 Id. at 12. 
67 Id. at 25. 
68 Id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Samuel J. Ervin, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).  
69 See id. at 272, 560, 600, 632, 669 (providing the statements of, inter alia, Senator Everett 
Dirksen; Senator Samuel J. Ervin, Jr.; A. Ross Eckler, the Acting Director of the Bureau of the Census; 
James J. Kilpatrick, vice chairman of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government; and 
Thomas J. Watkins, an Attorney from Mississippi, which discussed the high degree of voter apathy 
amongst a variety of demographics). 
70 Id. at 547 (statement of Judge Leander H. Perez, Plaquemines Parish, La.). 
71 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966). 
72 Id. at 308. 
73 Id. at 309. 
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exercised its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment in an inventive”74 
and even an “uncommon”75 way, it ultimately concluded “that exceptional 
conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”76 In 
light of the pervasive history of discrimination in the exercise of the 
franchise, the Court agreed with Congress that the VRA was necessary to 
effectuate the “commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.”77 
The structure of the Act, however, would lead the justices to revisit 
this question periodically. Congress faced a malfunctioning political 
process in 1965 and the VRA was designed to operate as a corrective 
measure, and in some respects, not much more.78 Put differently, the VRA 
was a remedy and not an entitlement. As originally implemented, the Act 
had a five-year sunset provision, on the assumption that the special 
provisions of the Act would finally turn the dream of the Fifteenth 
Amendment into a reality.79 Once black voters could register and vote 
freely, the need for the Act would subside. This was a sensible theory, but 
five years—or ten, or even seventeen years—would not be enough. This is 
why Congress continued to extend the special provisions of the Act in 
short spurts.80 
By 1980, when the Court examined the 1975 extension of the special 
provisions of the Act in City of Rome v. United States,81 the Act faced its 
toughest challenge yet. Among other objections, the City of Rome argued 
that the Act was unconstitutional;82 that the Act cannot be applied to 
changes that had a discriminatory effect but not a discriminatory purpose;83 
that the Act had outlived its usefulness;84 and that the Act violated 
federalism principles.85 President Nixon had named four new justices in 
                                                                                                                          
74 Id. at 327. 
75 Id. at 334. 
76 Id. (citation omitted). 
77 Id. at 337.  
78 See Voting Rights Act: Major Dates in History, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/print/voting-
rights-act-major-dates-history (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (asserting that the primary aims of the 
Voting Rights Act were to correct past barriers to political participation by minority groups and to 
eliminate wrongful election practices). 
79 See Federalist Society 2011 National Lawyers Convention, Showcase Panel IV: A Federal 
Sunset Law, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 339, 353–54 (2011) (speech of Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr.) 
(discussing the 1965 Voting Rights Act’s sunset provision and its implications for federalism). 
80 See Voting Rights Act: Major Dates in History, supra note 78 (noting that President Nixon, 
President Ford, President Reagan, and Congress extended provisions of the Voting Rights Act over 
short spans of time). 
81 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
82 Id. at 173. 
83 Id. at 172.  
84 Id. at 180. 
85 Id. at 178. 
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three years, and President Ford had named one.86 More importantly, Nixon 
had run his 1968 campaign under what became known as a “Southern 
Strategy.”87 Would Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell 
and Rehnquist continue to view the evidence as the Court had viewed it in 
1966?   
The early signs were not encouraging. In two cases prior to City of 
Rome, the conservative justices seemed to be laying down a marker for a 
reconsideration of the Court’s landmark voting rights decision in Allen v. 
State Board of Elections.88 Allen, decided in 1969, was important as the 
case that interpreted the scope of Section 5 broadly and in so doing adapted 
the Voting Rights Act to new circumstances. 89 For example, in Perkins v. 
Matthews,90 and in line with Allen, the Court held that changes to polling 
places, boundaries lines, and electoral structures were required to be pre-
cleared.91 But Justice Blackmun, joined by the Chief Justice, issued a 
warning, explicitly concurring in the judgment, “[g]iven the decision in 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, . . . a case not cited by the District 
Court.”92 And in Holt v. City of Richmond,93 where the Court enjoined the 
City Council elections for the City of Richmond, Virginia,94 Justices 
Burger and Blackmun offered a similar warning, this time joined by Justice 
Rehnquist.95 The stage apparently was set for a reexamination of Allen. It 
was only a matter of time until the Nixon appointees made their move. 
But the warnings came to naught. In City of Rome, the Court followed 
the previous script and once again sided with Congress and its view of the 
evidence. For example, the Court acknowledged, with Congress, that 
                                                                                                                          
86 Bill Mears, The Supreme Court & Election-Year Blockbusters, CNN POL. (Mar. 26, 2012, 4:02 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/25/politics/scotus-health-care-blockbusters; Gerald R. Ford 
Timeline, THE GERALD FORD PRESIDENTIAL FOUND., http://www.geraldrfordfoundation.org/about/ 
gerald-r-ford-timeline (last visited Sept. 25, 2014). 
87 See ROWLAND EVANS, JR. & ROBERT D. NOVAK, NIXON IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE 
FRUSTRATION OF POWER 137 (1971) (“[I]mportant was the political frame of mind in the Nixon White 
House as his Presidency began. The pivotal element in John Mitchell’s grand strategy of combining the 
1968 Nixon and Wallace Votes for a Republican majority in 1972 was the South.”); see also, e.g., 
HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY: RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 1960–1972 134 (1992) (discussing the inception, details, and goals of Nixon’s “Southern 
Strategy”). 
88 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
89 See id. at 565–67 (noting that the legislative history of the VRA and of Section 5 suggested 
Congress’s and the Court’s consensus that they were meant to be broad in scope).  
90 400 U.S. 379 (1971). 
91 Id. at 394. 
92 Id. at 397 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
93 406 U.S. 903 (1972). 
94 Id. at 903. 
95 Id. (“In joining in Mr. Justice Blackmun’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Perkins . . . I 
indicated that ‘[g]iven the decision in Allen . . . ,’ the result reached by the Court in Perkins followed. 
The instant motion for a stay is not an appropriate occasion to reconsider the holdings in Allen and 
Perkins.”). 
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registration rates of black voters had “improved dramatically” and that the 
number of black elected officials had also increased.96 And yet, the Court 
agreed with the congressional determination that “significant” registration 
disparities remained between black and white voters in covered 
jurisdictions.97 Also, black elected officials had only gained “relatively 
minor positions” and did not hold statewide offices, and the number of 
those elected to statewide offices was unrepresentative of the black 
population within the covered jurisdictions.98 The decision to extend the 
Act for seven years was “both unsurprising and unassailable.”99 The 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the judgments of Allen and City of Rome with 
respect to the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in voting.100 
Shelby County broke the pattern. Of course, the Court politely 
acknowledged early in the opinion that “voting discrimination still exists; 
no one doubts that.”101 But the central message of Shelby County is that 
“the era of big racism” is over.102 The majority confidently declared that 
“[t]here is no denying . . . that the conditions that originally justified” the 
coverage formula and preclearance requirement “no longer characterize 
voting in the covered jurisdictions.”103 For the majority, the VRA 
responded to a failure of the political marketplace where “[s]everal States 
had enacted a variety of requirements and tests ‘specifically designed to 
prevent’ African-Americans from voting.”104 But that era, according to the 
majority, is not reflective of the present era. “Nearly 50 years later,” Chief 
Justice Roberts proclaimed, “things have changed dramatically.”105 The 
vestiges or indicia of official state discrimination in voting are no more; 
“[v]oter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly 
discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority 
candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”106 Furthermore, Section 5 
objections had declined significantly, from 14.2 percent in the decade after 
enactment of the Act to a “mere 0.16 percent” in the decade before the last 
                                                                                                                          
96 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180 (1980). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 180–81. 
99 Id. at 182. 
100 See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 271 (1999) (“Monterey County was 
designated a covered jurisdiction based on findings that, as of November 1, 1968, the County 
maintained California’s statewide literacy test as a prerequisite for voting and less than 50 percent of 
the County’s voting age population participated in the November 1968 Presidential election.”) 
(citations omitted). 
101 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013). 
102 Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death 
of a Superstatute 41 (Maurer Sch. of Law, Ind. Univ., Bloomington Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 278, 2014), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377470.  
103 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618. 
104 Id. at 2624 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966)). 
105 Id. at 2625. 
106 Id. at 2621 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 498 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:481 
reenactment.107 These facts led the Court to only one conclusion, and 
toward the end of its opinion, as if to drive home the message, the Court 
once again declared in benediction, “[o]ur country has changed . . . .”108 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Shelby County took a 
decidedly different view. She acknowledged that the racial disparities in 
registration and voter turnout in the covered jurisdictions had diminished 
considerably, while also noting that this was to be expected after the Act 
had been in place for over forty years.109 In direct response to the Chief 
Justice’s use of Department of Justice objection percentages, she offered 
instead the absolute number of such objections, which was substantial.110 
Between 1982 and 2004, for example, the Attorney General objected to 
more voting changes from covered jurisdictions (626 objections) than he 
did between 1965 and 1982 (490 objections).111 Moreover, she argued that 
electoral barriers had shifted to what are known as second-generation 
barriers.112 These barriers included racial gerrymandering, shifting from 
redistricted to at-large elections, and annexations.113 
More generally, Justice Ginsburg urged deference to the record 
compiled by Congress in support of the statute.114 Of course, that record 
was not enough for the five-member majority. Responding to Justice 
Ginsburg’s argument about the record, Chief Justice Roberts maintained: 
“Regardless of how to look at the record . . . no one can fairly say that it 
shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and 
‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly 
distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that 
time.”115   
Justice Thomas, whose partial concurrence and dissent in Northwest 
Austin seemed to have served as an intellectual blueprint for the majority in 
                                                                                                                          
107 Id. at 2626. 
108 Id. at 2631. 
109 Id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. at 2639. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 2634. 
113 Id. at 2635. Incidentally, these were the same barriers first recognized by the Court in Allen as 
being within the scope of Section 5. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550–52, 571 
(1969) (discussing the proposed voting amendments to local Mississippi and Virginia voting laws that 
the Court would examine under Section 5). This recognition is what made Allen one of the most 
important cases in the history of the Act.  
114 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The record supporting the 
2006 reauthorization of the VRA is also extraordinary.”). According to the Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, the record in support of the 2006 
reauthorization was “one of the most extensive considerations of any piece of legislation that the 
United States Congress has dealt with in the 27½ years” he had been in the House. 152 CONG. REC. 
H5143 (July 13, 2006) (statement of Jim Rep. Sensenbrenner). 
115 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2629. 
 2014] STATE’S RIGHTS, LAST RITES, AND VOTING RIGHTS 499 
Shelby County, articulated the point in the starkest terms.116 With respect to 
the meaning of discrimination, he argued that the only “explicit 
prohibition” of the Fifteenth Amendment was against “intentional 
discrimination.”117 Moreover, “the constitutionality of section 5 has always 
depended on the proven existence of intentional discrimination so 
extensive that elimination of it through case-by-case enforcement would be 
impossible.”118 So as not to be misunderstood, he declared that the 
“extensive pattern of discrimination that led the Court to previously uphold 
section 5 as enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment no longer exists.”119 
Relatedly, he opined that vote dilution and second-generation barriers are 
“not probative of the type of purposeful discrimination that prompted 
Congress to enact § 5 in 1965.”120 Racially polarized voting, Section 5 
enforcement actions, and Section 2 and Section 4 lawsuits do not constitute 
“pervasive voting discrimination,” and are thus insufficient to justify the 
coverage-preclearance regime.121 
The epistemic dispute between the majority and dissent in Shelby 
County is over whether racial discrimination, which the majority defines as 
intentional and systematic discrimination, remains a significant problem in 
voting today.122 Following Shelby County, we can no longer confidently 
assume that the Court will permit Congress to justify voting rights law and 
policy on the ground of remedying racial discrimination in the political 
process. A current majority on the Court is deeply skeptical that state 
actors continue to engage in systemic racial discrimination in voting. If this 
point is correct, a Shelby County fix that attempts to reinstate the race-
based coverage-preclearance tandem, albeit an updated version, will have 
to overcome the Court’s challenge to show systematic racial discrimination 
as a justification for the fix. This will be close to impossible to show 
because as a consequence of the VRA itself, systematic racial 
discrimination has abated significantly.123 Seizing upon this fact, the 
majority in Shelby County all but declared that the era of big racism is 
over. A central claim of Shelby County is that systematic racial 
discrimination is a phenomenon of the past that can no longer justify broad 
congressional power to burden state actors with tedious compliance 
standards simply because of their tainted histories.124 
                                                                                                                          
116 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 212 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
117 Id. at 223. 
118 Id. at 225. 
119 Id. at 226. 
120 Id. at 228. 
121 Id. 
122 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (using statistics to show the problem of discrimination in 
voting). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 2627–28. 
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III.  THE END OF DEFERENCE AND COOPERATION 
Much epistemic uncertainty exists with respect to race and voting 
discrimination. The central question is whether we still have systematic 
racial discrimination in voting by state actors or perhaps, more precisely, 
what is the extent of racial discrimination in voting. Given this uncertainty, 
one possible resolution, perhaps the most obvious resolution, is for the 
Court to defer to the institution that is best positioned to resolve that 
uncertainty: Congress. There are many reasons why one might defer to 
Congress. Consider three possibilities. 
A.  Deference Because the Constitution Demands It  
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment explicitly grant Congress the “power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”125 Thus, one might 
argue that the Reconstruction Amendments not only shifted power away 
from the states to Congress, but also away from the Court to Congress.126 
At the very least, one might view the Reconstruction Amendments as 
establishing Congress and the Court as co-equal guarantors of equality in 
voting.127 Congress is as able as the Court, at least in this context, to 
determine what the Constitution requires.128 
This was arguably the Court’s judicial posture in Katzenbach v. 
Morgan,129 one of the most significant cases in the voting rights canon. In 
Morgan, the Court upheld Section 4(e) of the VRA, which provided that no 
person who has completed a sixth grade education in a school accredited 
by the commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be denied the right to vote on 
account of an inability to read or write English.130 Congress enacted the 
provision pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.131 The State of New York, challenging Section 4(e), sensibly 
argued that Congress did not have the power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to prohibit New York from enforcing its literacy requirement 
                                                                                                                          
125 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall 
have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
126 See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1823 (2010) (“The 
early history of the Reconstruction Amendments suggests that Congress believed that it had both the 
power and the obligation to interpret the Constitution when it passed enforcing legislation . . . .  
Including enforcement clauses in the text of the new amendments . . . presumed that Congress and the 
courts were coequal partners in interpreting and enforcing these provisions.”). 
127 Id.  
128 See id. at 1826 (discussing how, with respect to remedying constitutional violations occurring 
in society, broad congressional enforcement of constitutional principles has been more effective than 
“courts’ more limited interpretations” of such principles).  
129 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
130 Id. at 643, 658. 
131 Id. at 646. 
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because the Supreme Court held in Lassiter v. Northampton Election 
Board,132 a case decided a scant six years earlier, that literacy tests were 
not per se violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.    
The Court disagreed.133 Quoting from a prior Reconstruction Era 
precedent, the Court noted that “[i]t is the power of Congress which has 
been enlarged.”134 Moreover, the Court explained: 
A construction of §5 that would require a judicial 
determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded 
by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of 
sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate 
both congressional resourcefulness and congressional 
responsibility for implementing the Amendment. It would 
confine the legislative power in this context to the 
insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the 
judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or 
of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by 
particularizing the ‘majestic generalities’ of § 1 of the 
Amendment.135  
Thus, the question was not whether the application of the literacy 
requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause, as the Court would 
interpret the Constitution.136 Rather, “[w]ithout regard to whether the 
judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New 
York’s English literacy requirement as so applied, could Congress prohibit 
the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment?”137 The Court went on to note: “[c]orrectly viewed, § 5 is a 
positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its 
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure 
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”138  
Reviewing Congressional statutes enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a reviewing court must keep in mind that “[b]y 
including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific 
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers 
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”139 Citing the “classic 
                                                                                                                          
132 Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1959); see also Morgan, 
384 U.S. at 648–49 (discussing New York’s arguments in its defense of the literacy requirement). 
133 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 658 (“[T]he limitation on relief effected in § 4(e) does not constitute 
a forbidden discrimination . . . .”).   
134 Id. at 648 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879)).   
135 Id. at 648–49 (internal citations omitted).  
136 Id. at 649.  
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 651. 
139 Id. at 650. 
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formulation” in M’Culloch v. Maryland,140 as long as the statute is 
“‘appropriate legislation’ to enforce the Equal Protection Clause [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment],”141 the Court will defer to Congress’s 
judgment.142 Testifying in the Senate during the 1969 hearings on the 
VRA, former Solicitor General Cox referred to Morgan as “a token of 
congressional supremacy.”143 
In Morgan, the Court viewed Congress as a collaborator or partner in 
effectuating voting equality.144 The Court deferred to Congress’s judgment 
on the ground that the Constitution has granted Congress the power to 
enforce the provisions of the Reconstruction Amendment as Congress 
understands those provisions.145 Reflecting on the VRA and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 in a related context, Professor Lucas Powe observed:  
The Court was extending an offer to Congress to become a 
full partner in the Court’s great tasks, just as Congress had 
become with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. In making the offer the Court saw that its 
views and those of Congress were harmonious. Each was 
working as hard as it could to improve American life.146 
                                                                                                                          
140 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
141 Id. at 651 (citing M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 421). 
142 In a controversial footnote, the Court explained that “Congress’ power under § 5 is limited to 
adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to 
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.” Id. at 651 n.10. 
143 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507 and Title 
IV of S. 2029 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st 
Cong. 334 (1970) (statement of Archibald Cox, Professor, Harvard Law School). 
144 Think here of accounts of the Court as a member of the national coalition of its day. For the 
classic formulation, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 294 (1957) (“The main objective of presidential leadership is 
to build a stable and dominant aggregation of minorities with a high probability of winning the 
presidency and one or both houses of Congress. The main task of the Court is to confer legitimacy on 
the fundamental policies of the successful coalition. There are times when the coalition is unstable with 
respect to certain key policies; at very great risk to its legitimacy powers, the Court can intervene in 
such cases and may even succeed in establishing policy.”); and Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or 
Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
511, 518 (2007) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC 
BRANCH? HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE 
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2006)) (“The fundamental insight of 
the regime politics literature . . . is now reigning orthodoxy in political science and is increasingly 
widespread in legal scholarship as well.”). 
145 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 655–56 (1966). 
146 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 265 (2000); see 
Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 91, 91 (1966) (“A newer theme is the strong declaration of congressional power under Section 
5 of the fourteenth amendment. If the Congress follows the lead that the Court has provided, the last 
Term’s opinions interpreting Section 5 will prove as important in bespeaking national legislative 
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This was just as the Reconstruction Congress envisioned. 
Moreover, the Court’s prior cases would have also supported deference 
as a constitutional imperative. Consider briefly the state of the 
congressional powers doctrine at the time of Shelby County. In the voting 
rights context, it is clear to us that both Morgan and South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach easily support the extension of the Act in 2006.147 City of 
Boerne v. Flores,148 decided in 1997, was also on the side of congressional 
action.149 So was Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,150 
which upheld a provision of the Family Medical Leave Act under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment on a theory of gender discrimination,151 and 
Tennessee v. Lane,152 which upheld a provision of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act on a claim of access to the courts.153 These and related 
cases suggest that congressional powers reach farther under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment when Congress is dealing with types of 
discrimination that would trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause. When Congress deals with racial discrimination, in 
other words, its discretion is enhanced. This is precisely the category into 
which the VRA is most applicable. 
Further, the Court could have also relied on Hibbs and Lane on the 
ground that voting is a fundamental interest that is directly protected under 
the Reconstruction Amendments and thus deserving of heightened 
scrutiny.154 Or following Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lane, the Court could 
have also chosen to honor the principle of stare decisis and “apply the 
permissive M’Culloch standard to congressional measures designed to 
remedy racial discrimination by the States.”155 The bottom line is that 
existing doctrine offered much support for Congress and the VRA. 156  
                                                                                                                          
authority to promote human rights as the Labor Board decisions of 1937 were in providing national 
authority to regulate the economy.”) (footnote omitted). 
147 See supra text accompanying notes 75–80 (acknowledging that the current evidence played a 
role in the Katzenbach Court’s decision); supra text accompanying note 133 (stating that the Morgan 
Court deferred to Congress’s research in its decision). 
148 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
149 Id. at 536. 
150 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
151 Id. at 737. 
152 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
153 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004). 
154 Id. at 533–34 (holding that “the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid 
exercise of Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Hibbs, 
538 U.S. at 728 (“[S]tatutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are subject to 
heightened scrutiny.”). 
155 Lane, 541 U.S. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia hedges, and “would not, of course, 
permit any congressional measures that violate other provisions of the Constitution.” Id. Assuming that 
one believes that the “equality of states” doctrine is one such provision, the charge of inconsistency in 
the pursuit of a policy goal is thankfully avoided. 
156 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Legislative Findings, Congressional Powers, and the Future of the 
Voting Rights Act, 82 IND. L.J. 99, 122–26 (2007). One of the more interesting questions in the case is 
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B.  Deference for Institutional Reasons: Congress Can Compile a Record 
and Make Findings 
Beyond the textual and constitutional argument, the Court might also 
defer for institutional reasons. In particular, one might view Congress as 
the best institution to resolve the types of epistemic uncertainty that we see 
in the voting rights context. This is because Congress is able to make 
nationwide systematic findings and to create a record in support of its 
statute. It may be—and the historical record fully supports this—that as 
between piecemeal adjudication through the judicial system and legislation 
through the political process, adjudication is less well suited to resolve this 
type of epistemic uncertainty. Thus, courts should defer to the epistemic 
judgments of legislative bodies on the ground that legislatures are better 
institutions to resolve epistemic uncertainties. 
This was Justice Ginsburg’s contention in Shelby County. She advised 
that “the Court should have left the matter where it belongs: in Congress’ 
bailiwick.”157 This was also the posture that the Court adopted in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, where the Court framed the approach that would 
guide nearly fifty years of voting rights jurisprudence: “As against the 
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to 
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in 
voting.”158 Deference was the order of the day, and much language in the 
Court’s opinion underscored as much. Sprinkled throughout the opinion 
are references to “legitimate response[s]”159 by Congress, “appropriate 
means”160 that Congress may employ, and “permissible method[s]”161 that 
Congress may use.   
To be sure, this language is less than crystal clear and could be 
understood as an argument for constitutional deference. The problem for 
the Court was that the VRA was an unusual statute. For one, Congress was 
aiming its considerable powers at the Southern states, and, in so doing, it 
sought to redraw the federalism lines that were drawn at the end of the first 
Reconstruction. Complicating matters, the VRA did not only show distrust 
of the state legislatures; the preclearance requirement similarly bypassed 
southern judges, federal and state, by requiring covered jurisdictions to 
                                                                                                                          
why the majority in Shelby failed to rely on the Court’s prior federalism precedent. The phrase 
“congruence and proportionality” is nowhere to be found in the opinion. Instead the Court turned to the 
concept of the “equality of the states” to strike down Section 4(b). Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. 
Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013). As we argue in the last Part of this Article, the conservative justices had a much 
larger goal in mind; redemption and existing doctrine had little if anything helpful to say about that. We 
are indebted to our colleague Dan Conkle for helping us navigate these doctrinal questions. 
157 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650. 
158 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966). 
159 Id. at 328. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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preclear their election changes with the Department of Justice or district 
court in D.C.162 The preclearance requirement cast an accusing—even 
offensive—light on southern judges and their integrity and it privileged an 
administrative agency to the southern judiciary. 
Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion for the Court in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach responded to these concerns with history, the 
specter of Bull Connor and, importantly for our purposes, the substantial 
congressional record in support of the statute. This was not to say that 
rationality review demanded extensive findings. Findings were not 
generally required as a condition to uphold congressional acts as a 
constitutional question,163 but they buttressed the case in this context as 
Congress was exercising its powers with great inventiveness. With respect 
to the record, the Court noted: 
The constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
must be judged with reference to the historical experience 
which it reflects. Before enacting the measure, Congress 
explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination 
in voting. The House and Senate Committees on the 
Judiciary each held hearings for nine days and received 
testimony from a total of 67 witnesses. More than three full 
days were consumed discussing the bill on the floor of the 
House, while the debate in the Senate covered 26 days in all. 
At the close of these deliberations, the verdict of both 
chambers was overwhelming. The House approved the bill 
by a vote of 328–74, and the measure passed the Senate by a 
margin of 79–18.164 
With the benefit of hindsight and the reality of Shelby County, it is easy to 
see why emphasizing the record compiled by Congress was a risky move. 
Justice Brennan could see it as soon as he read the first draft of the opinion. 
In notes he wrote on the margins of his circulated draft, he queried the 
reliance on the congressional record by Warren’s opinion. For example, he 
asked, “Do we judge statutes by no. of witnesses[,] length of hearings[,] 
unanimity of vote? The Chief is judging the legislative product as if it were 
                                                                                                                          
162 See id. at 359–60 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I cannot help but believe that the inevitable effect of 
any such law which forces any one of the States to entreat federal authorities in far-away places for 
approval of local laws before they can become effective is to create the impression that the State or 
States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces.”). 
163 See id. at 326–27 (majority opinion) (explaining the limits of congressional power without any 
mention as to the necessity of findings). 
164 Id. at 308–09 (footnotes omitted). 
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a judicial one.”165 By the end of the first part of the draft, he offered the 
following criticism: “In several places, like this one, the Chief comes close 
to writing this as if it were an advisory opinion. I think this might be 
avoided. Are we reviewing the sections, any more than we are the 
adequacy of the hearings?”166   
Justice Brennan raised some important questions. How would the 
Court go about deciding how many hearings are enough, or how many 
witnesses, or pages of testimony? What weight should be given to the vote 
margins by which the VRA and subsequent extensions pass each chamber? 
Perhaps, most importantly, how convincingly must Congress demonstrate 
the existence of racial discrimination to justify the VRA? These are 
questions without definitive answers, and Justice Brennan wished to 
remove the Court from taking a central role in deciding them. In particular, 
he was looking to the future, to a time when the record would not be as 
robust as it was then. He was looking, in other words, to the world that 
gave rise to Shelby County. 
We thus understand Katzenbach v. Morgan as Justice Brennan’s 
attempt to fix what he perceived to be a flaw in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach. He wished to take the spotlight off the record and emphasize 
instead the deferential standard of review.167 Deference, as we argued 
earlier, was owed as a matter of constitutional law, not institutional 
competence.168 Justice Brennan could foresee that the future of the Act 
hung on the Court’s resolution of this debate. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, in 
fact, Justice Harlan argued in his dissent that the Court in South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach deferred to Congress only after that body had compiled a 
record to present an affirmative showing of a Fifteenth Amendment 
violation in support of its remedial action.169 Congress had done no such 
thing in support of Section 4(e).170   
Justice Brennan won this particular battle. The Court upheld Section 
4(e) by going back to its traditional rationality review. The Court did not 
mention the issue of legislative findings at all. The question was whether 
Section 4(e) was “appropriate legislation” to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, whether it was “plainly adapted to that end,” and whether it 
                                                                                                                          
165 Chief Justice Warren, Original Draft of South Carolina v. Katzenbach 3 (Feb. 23, 1966) 
(Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Box I:132, folder 6, copy on file with author) (including Justice 
Brennan's handwritten notes on draft).  
166 Id. at 11.  
167 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650–51 (explaining the court’s deference to 
congressional power). 
168 See supra part III.A (arguing that reconstruction amendments increased deference to Congress 
actions regarding voting rights). 
169 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 667 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
170 Id. at 669. 
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was in accord with “the letter and spirit of the Constitution.”171 For 
example, this was an area in which Congress brought a “specially informed 
legislative competence.”172 Also, “[i]t was for Congress . . . to assess and 
weigh the various conflicting considerations.”173 Congress was owed 
deference because it was better positioned than the judiciary to determine 
the existence and extent of racial discrimination in voting. More 
importantly, the Court deferred because the Constitution so demanded. Of 
note, nothing in South Carolina v. Katzenbach suggested otherwise. 
This is precisely the debate we see in Shelby County between Chief 
Justice Roberts in the majority and Justice Ginsburg in the dissent. 
Channeling Chief Justice Warren in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and as 
a precursor to making an argument that “[i]t is well established that 
Congress’ judgment regarding exercise of its power to enforce the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments warrants substantial deference,” 
Justice Ginsburg sought to focus the Court’s attention on the “sizeable 
record.”174 She remarked that “[t]he House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees held 21 hearings, heard from scores of witnesses, received a 
number of investigative reports and other written documentation of 
continuing discrimination in covered jurisdictions. In all, the legislative 
record Congress compiled filled more than 15,000 pages.”175 Similarly, the 
record for supporting the extension of the preclearance requirement “was 
huge.”176 In addition, she accused the majority of “mak[ing] no genuine 
attempt to engage with the massive legislative record that Congress 
assembled.”177 She went on to note: 
Congress approached the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA 
with great care and seriousness. The same cannot be said of 
the Court’s opinion today. The Court makes no genuine 
attempt to engage with the massive legislative record that 
Congress assembled. Instead, it relies on increases in voter 
registration and turnout as if that were the whole story. . . . 
Without even identifying a standard of review, the Court 
dismissively brushes off arguments based on “data from the 
record,” and declines to enter the “debat[e about] what [the] 
record shows.” . . . One would expect more from an opinion 
striking at the heart of the Nation’s signal piece of civil-rights 
                                                                                                                          
171 Id. at 651 (citing M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819). 
172 Id. at 656. 
173 Id. at 653. 
174 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
175 Id. at 2635–2636 (2013) (citing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 
205 (2009)); H.R. REP. NO. 109–478, at 5, 11–12 (2006); S. REP. NO. 109–295, at 2–4, 15 (2006). 
176 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2639. 
177 Id. at 2644. 
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legislation.178 
Chief Justice Roberts offered two responses to the dissent’s argument 
that the majority refused to engage with the record. First, the Chief Justice 
argued—a point that Justice Brennan anticipated—that the record amassed 
by Congress in 2006 pales in comparison to the record amassed by 
Congress in 1965. “Regardless of how to look at the record,” the Chief 
remarked, “no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the 
‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that 
faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the covered 
jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time.”179 In other words, the 
record did nothing to convince the majority that racial discrimination in 
voting remained a significant problem in the twenty-first century. More 
importantly, this was not a question of deference for the majority.   
Second, the Chief Justice argued that “a more fundamental problem 
remains: Congress did not use the record it compiled to shape a coverage 
formula grounded in current conditions. It instead reenacted a formula 
based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.”180 
As Justice Brennan anticipated, and Chief Justice Roberts demonstrated, if 
deference were owed to the record, it was a simple matter to conclude that 
the record was not good enough, that the record had not met some mystical 
or historical bar. 
The Chief Justice had two choices in Shelby County. He could have 
followed the historical path and treated the case as a question of 
constitutional deference under the Reconstruction Amendments. This was 
what the Court did in Morgan.181 Alternatively, he could have followed the 
institutional path and considered the case as a question of deference under 
conditions of epistemic uncertainty. This was what the Court did in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach.182 He followed the latter, of course, but with an 
ironic twist. Though professing self-restraint, the majority in Shelby 
County took a very aggressive view of the facts in order to strike down a 
federal statute.183 In this respect, a conservative Court out-liberaled Justice 
Brennan.   
                                                                                                                          
178 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
179 Id. at 2629 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 557 U.S. at 201; South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 315, 331 (1966)). 
180 Id.  
181 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1966) (holding that Section 4(e) of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 is “a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress by §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”). 
182 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308 (holding that the challenged sections of the 
Voting Rights Act “are an appropriate means for carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibilities 
and are consonant with all other provisions of the Constitution”). 
183 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Activism and the Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 857, 859 (2011) (arguing that the Court, though maintaining a posture of deference 
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C.  Deference to Congress as a Partner 
Finally, one might defer to Congress because the VRA—its history and 
evolution—so counsels. According to Chief Justice Roberts, the VRA is 
not “just like any other piece of legislation, . . . [as] this Court has made 
clear from the beginning . . . the Voting Rights Act is far from ordinary.”184 
We agree with the Chief Justice about the special nature of the VRA, yet 
disagree about what this means. As we argue elsewhere, the VRA must be 
understood as a superstatute, that is, landmark legislation that demands the 
cooperation of multiple branches of government in order to fulfill its 
purposes.185 Rather than a sharp break from the past, we understand the Act 
as a necessary response to a fundamental democratic deficit. It is also true 
that, from its inception, the Court has understood the VRA precisely in this 
way and has willingly cooperated with Congress, as the people’s 
representatives, in fulfilling the Act’s considerable promise. The point here 
is that it takes (or took) all three branches working together to fulfill the 
promises of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court needed 
Congress’s help (and vice versa) to eradicate the scourge of racial 
discrimination in voting.  
To make sense of this argument, it is important to remember that 
voting discrimination had been an issue that neither the political branches 
nor the courts could address alone. In Justice Ginsburg’s apt description, 
fighting voter discrimination “resembled battling the Hydra.”186 No sooner 
had a court case declared a practice unconstitutional under the Fifteenth 
Amendment than a new practice arose in its place. Adjudication proved to 
be time-consuming and ineffectual. In important respects, the need for the 
VRA reflected not simply the intransigence and persistence of racial 
discrimination in voting, but the institutional limitations of the judiciary in 
fulfilling the promises of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  
But Congress also needed the cooperation of the judiciary to 
accomplish the aims of the VRA. Further, it is clear that Congress was 
confronting an insidious and pervasive problem devoid of easy solutions. 
The language of the Act was short on specifics and subject to myriad 
interpretations. What, after all, is a “voting qualification or prerequisite to 
voting or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting?”187 When 
                                                                                                                          
to the Voting Rights Act, “has interpreted the language of the Act dynamically, often in total disregard 
to the text of the law or the intent of Congress”).  
184 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2630. 
185 See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter, supra note 102 (explaining 
that a superstatute, such as the VRA, “is landmark legislation that addresses a significant public policy 
question, the resolution of which compels the cooperation of all branches of government”); see also 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 27 (2010) (offering the VRA as a classic example of a superstatute). 
186 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
187 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012). 
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does a voting change “not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color?”188 And 
what is the meaning of the language of Section 2 of the Act, which 
prohibits the denial or abridgment of the right to vote “on account of race 
or color?”189 These were questions for the future, for the courts to sort 
through and for the executive to enforce through Section 5. The Court and 
the executive would confront them in due course, flexibly and with a mind 
towards eliminating the “blight of racial discrimination in voting.”190 
The Court understood the need for a partnership in this context from 
the moment it first confronted the VRA in the Katzenbach cases.191 The 
Katzenbach cases signaled the Court’s willingness to share responsibility 
with Congress to move the country forward.192 The Court knew that it was 
unable to take on this problem all by itself. Perhaps the Justices were being 
more than polite during President Johnson’s voting rights address as they 
joined members of Congress in applause a number of times, which led 
critics of the bill to question their impartiality.193    
In one of the early and most significant voting cases to come before the 
Court, Allen v. State Board of Elections, the Court strongly signaled its 
intention to cooperate with Congress to address the problem of voting 
discrimination.194 Allen is best known as the Court’s first substantive 
interpretation of the VRA. The case is far more important to us, however, 
for the way in which it handled a number of preliminary jurisdictional 
issues. How the Court decided these questions would go a long way in 
determining the effectiveness of the Act. Unsurprisingly, the Court decided 
these questions expansively, even where the language of the statute was 
either silent or in apparent tension with the Court’s preferred conclusions. 
Take, for example, the question of coverage: what is the statutory 
                                                                                                                          
188 Id. 
189 Id. § 1973(b). 
190 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
191 POWE, supra note 146, at 265 (“The Court was extending an offer to Congress to become a full 
partner in the Court’s great tasks . . . .”). 
192 See id. (“[T]he Court saw that its views and those of Congress were harmonious. Each was 
working as hard as it could to improve American life.”); see also Cox, supra note 146, at 91 (“If the 
Congress follows the lead that the Court has provided, the last Term’s opinions interpreting section 5 
will prove as important in bespeaking national legislative authority to promote human rights as the 
Labor Board decisions of 1937 were in providing national authority to regulate the economy.”) 
(internal footnote omitted). 
193 See Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 642 
(1965) (statement of James Kilpatrick, Vice Chairman of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional 
Government) (“[I]t is . . . unfortunate that members of the Supreme Court of the United States 
appeared—turned up to here [sic] the President’s message and appeared on the television cameras 
applauding. I think this is a violation of the separation of powers of the United States and creates 
imbalances.”). 
194 Allen v. State Bd. Of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (weighing legislative history and 
Congress’s intention in passing the Voting Rights Act ). 
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definition of a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” that 
would be subject to preclearance under the Act?195 The Court could have 
taken the view of the plaintiffs, who argued that the statute only covered 
changes that determined who may register to vote.196 The Court rejected 
this interpretation, on the view that “[t]he Voting Rights Act was aimed at 
the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of 
denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.”197 Instead, the 
Court concluded that “[t]he legislative history on the whole supports the 
view that Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the 
election law of a covered State in even a minor way.”198   
But as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissenting opinion, this reading 
of the statute ran into some very difficult problems.199 For example, the 
words of the statute could not be clearer.200 Only voting changes that voters 
must comply with were subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Act; 
to Justice Harlan, this was the end of the matter.201 Not so for a majority of 
justices. In Allen, and in spite of this language, the Court found a 
legislative intent to expand the reach of the Act that “all changes, no matter 
how small, be subjected to § 5 scrutiny.”202 While the government’s brief 
suggested that the language was “merely the result of an oversight,”203 the 
majority opinion simply ignored the language altogether.  
Allen was not the last case in which the Court interpreted the statutory 
language expansively to update the Act or to address issues that Congress 
did not anticipate.204 This is not to say that the Court has always expanded 
                                                                                                                          
195 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2012). 
196 Allen, 393 U.S. at 564. 
197 Id. at 565. 
198 Id. at 566. 
199 Id. at 582–94 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
200 Here is the relevant portion of the Act: 
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set 
forth in section 4(a) are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with 
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, such 
State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, 
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not 
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, 
and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the 
right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, 
practice, or procedure . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
201 Allen, 393 U.S. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
202 Id. at 568 (majority opinion). 
203 Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
204 See  Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 47 (1978) (interpreting the Voting 
Rights Act Section 5 to encompass a rule requiring board of education members to take an unpaid leave 
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the language of the Act. Rather, it is to say that the text of the VRA has, at 
best, served as a jumping-off point for making voting rights policy. Not 
even the plain meaning of an unambiguous text has cabined the Court’s 
interpretations of the Act.   
This was true as late as five years ago, in Northwest Austin. The case 
seemed to present a fairly prosaic statutory interpretation question. Under 
the clear terms of the statute, only states or political subdivisions could 
seek bailout from coverage. The plaintiff, a utility district, was not a state, 
and a political subdivision was defined by the statute as “any county or 
parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the 
supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other 
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”205 The lower 
court correctly understood this language to bar the utility district from 
escaping coverage. To the Court, however, “specific precedent, the 
structure of the Voting Rights Act, and underlying constitutional concerns 
compel a broader reading of the bailout provision.”206 From the Court’s 
perspective, it had to amend the Act in order to avoid a constitutional 
problem and strike down an act of Congress. The Court was clear on this 
point: “all political subdivisions—not only those described in §14(c)(2)—
are eligible to file a bailout suit.”207   
In Northwest Austin, the Chief Justice had been willing to author an 
opinion updating the Act in order to save it. In Shelby County, however, he 
wrote that “[w]e cannot . . . try our hand at updating the statute ourselves, 
based on the new record compiled by Congress.”208 In Northwest Austin, 
the Chief Justice expressed a reluctance to strike down an Act of Congress 
because “Congress is a coequal branch of government,” the “Fifteenth 
Amendment empowers ‘Congress,’ not the Court, to determine in the first 
instance what legislation is needed to enforce it,” and because “Congress 
amassed a sizable record in support of its decision to extend the 
preclearance requirements.”209 The Court was not willing to strike down 
the Act in Northwest Austin out of deference to a co-equal branch.   
In Shelby County, the Court declared that the era of deference was 
over. When Congress first promulgated the VRA, the Court remarked that 
                                                                                                                          
of absence while campaigning for office because it falls within the meaning of a “standard, practice, or 
procedure with respect to voting”); United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 128 n.15 (1978) 
(finding that the term “political subdivision” is only relevant for purposes of determining geographical 
coverage where a whole state is not covered); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1971) (“§ 5 
requires prior submission of any changes in the location of polling places”). 
205 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (1964). 
206 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 207 (2009). 
207 Id. at 211. 
208 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013). 
209 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 557 U.S. at 205 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the “coverage formula [was] rational in both practice and theory.”210 The 
Chief explained that in 1966, “the coverage formula—the means of linking 
the exercise of the unprecedented authority with the problem that 
warranted it—made sense.”211 As explained by Chief Justice Roberts, 
“rational in both theory and practice” meant that there was both a 
theoretical and practical understanding of what caused the discrimination 
(tests and devices); what were its effects (disparities in voter registration 
and turnout); and how to address the cause and effect (the coverage 
formula).212 Congress’s use of tests and devices as a way of identifying the 
covered jurisdictions was rational because tests and devices were not 
simply proxies for discrimination but were in fact instruments of 
discrimination.213 “The formula looked to cause (discriminatory tests) and 
effect (low voter registration and turnout), and tailored the remedy 
(preclearance) to those jurisdictions exhibiting both.”214 
Forty years later, the formula is no longer rational.215 This is because 
the tests and devices that the formula used as a trigger are no longer 
devices of racial discrimination. In 1966 literacy tests were synonymous 
with racial discrimination and therefore it was rational to use them as a 
trigger to capture the states that were engaged in systematic discrimination, 
but because literacy tests have been banned for almost forty years, they 
cannot be responsible for current voting problems.216 Thus, the government 
does not have a story to tell about causation. Moreover, because voter 
registration and turnout are equal between blacks and whites or have 
approached near parity, the government also does not have a story to tell 
about effect. Consequently, from the perspective of the majority, the 
coverage formula is a remedy in search of a problem.217 The era of 
deference has been replaced, at least from one scholar’s perspective, by the 
era of disdain.218 
                                                                                                                          
210 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 2617 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301, 330 (1966)). 
213 Id. at 2625 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 330). 
214 Id. at 2627. 
215 We are grateful to Rick Pildes for helping us flesh out this point and urging us to address it. 
216 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (“The formula captures States by reference to literacy tests 
and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned 
nationwide for over 40 years.”). 
217 Having concluded that the trigger was no longer rational, in theory or in fact, because the 
formula does not capture current purported discriminatory practices, the Court felt free to dismiss the 
government’s reverse-engineering argument that “Congress identified the jurisdictions to be covered 
and then came up with criteria to describe them.” Id. at 2628 (emphasis in original). Chief Justice 
Roberts argues that the argument is not compelling because the government “does not even attempt to 
demonstrate the continued relevance of the formula to the problem it targets.” Id.  
218 Pamela S. Karlan, Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2, 65–66 (2012). 
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IV. REDEEMING THE STATES AND THE SOUTH FROM THE PAST 
Consider now the question of the proper allocation of authority for 
elections as between the states and the federal government. This struggle 
between the states and the national government with respect to the 
apportionment of powers over elections has waxed and waned throughout 
American history. Concomitantly, the Court has also assumed the role of 
arbiter, fixing the metes and bounds of the authority of each over elections. 
The Court has often stated as a constitutional principle the proposition that 
the states “have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the 
right of suffrage may be exercised . . . .”219 But it has sometimes qualified 
the constitutional principle with the caveat that “once the franchise is 
granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”220 The 
tug of war between the states and the federal government for final say over 
elections, and the Court’s role as arbitrator, is an important part of our 
constitutional history.221 Shelby County is simply the latest scene, though 
assuredly not the last, in a long running drama. 
The obvious starting point is the Reconstruction Era, when the federal 
government began to aggressively assert its authority against the states in 
matters of elections. This was a time when the pendulum swung heavily 
from the states, which were clothed with the authority to regulate elections 
under the Constitution of 1787, to the federal government as protector of 
voting rights.222 The classic example of this newfound posture is the 
Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, which required that the new state 
constitutions in the South extend the right to vote to “male citizens of said 
State, twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or 
previous condition . . . except such as may be disfranchised for 
                                                                                                                          
219 Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) (citing Pope v. 
Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1904)). 
220 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966). 
221 Professor Joshua Douglas has recently authored a wonderful piece exploring this question with 
great depth. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405396; 
see RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK 
ENFRANCHISEMENT (2004) (presenting a historical overview of the enfranchisement of African 
Americans in America). 
222 See VALELLY, supra note 221, at 16 (“Under the Constitution of 1787, the determination of 
voting rights fell to state and local governments. But the Civil War and Reconstruction, and the ensuing 
massive program of African American electoral inclusion, recast the constitutional responsibilities for 
establishing and protecting voting rights by means of ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment and 
passage of several implementing statutes. These legal initiatives posed an enormous challenge to 
widely held conceptions of American federalism.”). 
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participation in the rebellion or for felony at common law . . . .”223 The Act 
was soon followed by both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
which sought to delegate the responsibility for the full enfranchisement of 
the newly freedmen to the national government. Taken together, these 
various efforts to protect the franchise against racial discrimination 
accomplished their aims as Blacks registered, voted, and took office at 
unprecedented levels.  
By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the pendulum had 
clearly swung away from the promise of Reconstruction and from the 
federal government and back to the states. Southern redemption proved 
particularly unkind to the Black political community. The South used 
myriad methods to disenfranchise black voters, including literacy tests and 
poll taxes, complex registration and residency requirements, and fraud and 
violence. These practices had their desired effect, so that “[b]y the early 
1900s, such measures had virtually eliminated black political participation 
in the South.”224 Reconstruction, with its promise of political equality as 
enforced by a strong national government, was clearly over. The states 
were once again in charge of elections.225     
There would be fits and starts in the intervening years, from cases 
striking down grandfather clauses and the white primaries in Texas, but not 
until the Civil Rights Era would the pendulum shift towards a much 
stronger national involvement in protecting the right to vote. The 
archetypical representation of federal power was the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. The Act was the actualization of the original meaning of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, specifically the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. The VRA was a signal of national power and national 
responsibility, as against the states, for preserving the right to vote, 
particularly against racial discrimination. This is why we think that Justice 
Ginsburg was right when she wrote in Shelby County that “[w]hen 
confronting the most constitutionally invidious form of discrimination, and 
the most fundamental right in our democratic system, Congress’ power to 
act is at its height.”226 
However, the VRA did not simply represent the apotheosis of federal 
power; it was concomitantly a symbol of the subject position of the states, 
specifically the southern states, and perhaps the most visible reminder of 
our national and original sin, slavery. It was also a reminder of the Civil 
                                                                                                                          
223 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429, amended by Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 
15 Stat. 2, amended by Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14, amended by Act of Mar. 11, 1868, ch. 
25, 15 Stat. 41. 
224 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77 
(2007); see J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974). 
225 VALELLY, supra note 221, at 100. 
226 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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War and Reconstruction.227 By targeting selected southern jurisdictions 
with a history of racial discrimination in voting, which happened to be 
almost all of the states of the Old Confederacy, and requiring them to pre-
clear these jurisdictions’ voting changes, the Act treated the southern states 
as “little more than conquered provinces.”228   
In both Northwest Austin and Shelby County, Chief Justice Roberts has 
cryptically referred to the “federalism costs” of the VRA. Though he has 
not said much about these federalism costs, if one examines these issues 
from the context of the historical circumstances that gave rise to the VRA, 
it is plausible to conclude that the supposed harm to the states is not 
consequential but expressive. Northwest Austin and Shelby County help us 
understand the “federalism costs” of the VRA in expressive terms; it is the 
message that the VRA sends about the proper and respective roles of the 
federal government and the states.229 Or perhaps more precisely and 
directly, it is the fact that the VRA sends a message of national superiority 
and state subservience over elections. This is the expressive harm that 
Chief Justice Roberts framed in dignity terms in Northwest Austin and later 
elaborated upon in Shelby County.   
Whether one agrees or not with Justice Black’s provocative 
characterization of the effect of the coverage-preclearance duo of the VRA, 
the post-VRA Supreme Court understood the Reconstruction Amendments 
to privilege federal regulation over state regulation in voting, particularly 
where voting regulation intersected with race. It is in the full-throated 
register of a nationalist that Chief Justice Warren roared in South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach: 
The language and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, the 
prior decisions construing its several provisions, and the 
general doctrines of constitutional interpretation, all point to 
one fundamental principle. As against the reserved powers of 
the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate 
the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in 
voting. . . . Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment declares 
that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.” This declaration has always been treated as self-
executing and has repeatedly been construed, without further 
                                                                                                                          
227 Fishkin, supra note 31, at 180. 
228 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 360 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
229 See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and 
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 
485 (1993) (explaining that expressive harms are the “kinds of harms against which the Constitution 
protects”). 
 2014] STATE’S RIGHTS, LAST RITES, AND VOTING RIGHTS 517 
legislative specification, to invalidate state voting 
qualifications or procedures which are discriminatory on 
their face or in practice.230 
Though Chief Justice Warren perfunctorily acknowledged “the general 
rule . . . that States ‘have broad powers to determine the conditions under 
which the right of suffrage may be exercised[,]’” the general rule is 
cabined by the corollary that the “Fifteenth Amendment supersedes 
contrary exertions of state power.”231 Congress has a power that is 
“‘complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the 
constitution.’”232 Chief Justice Warren’s departing premise is nationalist to 
its core. His premise presumes federal power as the default premise and 
assumes the legitimacy of the exercise of federal power until proved 
otherwise by a rational basis standard. For Chief Justice Warren and the 
post-Voting Rights Act Supreme Court, Congress possesses near plenary 
power over the states and only when Congress exercises its power 
irrationally does it become unconstitutional.  
By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts departs from a very different 
premise altogether, that of state supremacy. As he notes:  
States retain broad autonomy in structuring their 
governments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the 
Constitution provides that all powers not specifically granted 
to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or 
citizens . . .  
More specifically, “the Framers of the Constitution intended 
the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth 
Amendment, the power to regulate elections.” Of course, the 
Federal Government retains significant control over federal 
elections. But States have “broad powers to determine the 
conditions under which the right of suffrage may be 
exercised.”233  
For Chief Justice Roberts, the default position is the presumption and 
legitimacy of state power as against the federal government.234 The Chief 
Justice appealed to the Constitution of 1791 as opposed to the Constitution 
                                                                                                                          
230 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324–25. 
231 Id. at 325 (quoting Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965)). 
232 Id. at 327 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)). 
233 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
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of 1870. It is as if the Reconstruction Amendments never happened.235 It is 
federal, not state, power that must be justified under the Constitution.   
In striking down Section 4(b) of the Act in Shelby County, Chief 
Justice Roberts wrested the nationalist premise from its moorings and 
replaced it with state supremacy as the pendulum swings yet again. As 
importantly, the Chief Justice introduced, or he might say reintroduced, an 
additional consideration. Recall that in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
Chief Justice Warren stated as the “fundamental principle” plenary, or 
near-plenary, Congressional power.236 In Shelby County, Chief Justice 
Roberts, announced a different, competing, and incongruous fundamental 
principle: 
Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, 
there is also a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” 
among the States. . . . Over a hundred years ago, this Court 
explained that our Nation “was and is a union of States, equal 
in power, dignity and authority.” . . . Indeed, “the 
constitutional equality of the States is essential to the 
harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the 
Republic was organized.” . . . Coyle concerned the admission 
of new States, and Katzenbach rejected the notion that the 
principle operated as a bar on differential treatment outside 
that context. . . . At the same time, as we made clear in 
Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent 
                                                                                                                          
235 For a terrific discussion about the import of the Reconstruction Amendments for our 
federalism, see Fishkin, supra note 31, at 179. We agree with Fishkin, if partially, when he writes: 
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disparate treatment of States.237 
The Chief Justice attributed the “fundamental principle” to the Court’s 
decision in Northwest Austin. But Northwest Austin simply asserted the 
point and provided no support for the assertion. Consider the relevant 
passage from Northwest Austin: 
The Act also differentiates between the States, despite our 
historic tradition that all the States enjoy “equal sovereignty.” 
Distinctions can be justified in some cases. “The doctrine of 
the equality of States . . . does not bar . . . remedies for local 
evils which have subsequently appeared.” But a departure 
from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires 
a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is 
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.238 
Prior to Northwest Austin, the argument for “equal sovereignty” was 
generally understood as applicable only at the time of admission. The cases 
cited by the Court do not hold otherwise. In United States v. Louisiana,239 
for example, the Court explained that: 
[t]his Court early held that the 13 original States, by virtue of 
the sovereignty acquired through revolution against the 
Crown, owned the lands beneath navigable inland waters 
within their territorial boundaries, and that each subsequently 
admitted State acquired similar rights as an inseparable 
attribute of the equal sovereignty guaranteed to it upon 
admission.240 
And more importantly, South Carolina v. Katzenbach ratified the view that 
the equal sovereignty argument was only relevant in the context of 
admission of a state to the United States. The Court stated in Katzenbach 
that “[t]he doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, 
does not bar this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon 
which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local 
evils which have subsequently appeared.”241 
Given the Court’s clear and unequivocal rejection of the equal 
sovereignty argument as a valid constitutional objection to the VRA in 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, how was it determinative in Shelby County? 
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The Court’s decision in Northwest Austin is of course the key point of 
transition. As the Chief Justice said in response to one of Justice 
Ginsburg’s points in dissent, “the dissent analyzes the question presented 
as if our decision in Northwest Austin never happened. . . . [T]he dissent 
refuses to consider the principle of equal sovereignty, despite Northwest 
Austin’s emphasis on its significance.”242 As it has become clearer with 
hindsight, the battle for the constitutionality of the VRA was lost on the 
hill of Northwest Austin,243 though many in the civil rights community 
thought otherwise at the time.  
In Northwest Austin, the Court noted “our historic tradition that all the 
States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”244 The Court then went on to note that 
there can be exceptions to the “historic tradition” because “[d]istinctions 
can be justified in some cases.”245 The resurrection is performed in the 
sentence that followed. The Court quoted South Carolina v. Katzenbach 
for the following proposition: “The doctrine of the equality of States . . . 
does not bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subsequently 
appeared.”246 The Court closed out the paragraph by noting, in the 
language that we quoted above, that “a departure from the fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate 
geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”247  
As an aside, note how equal sovereignty begins as an “historic 
tradition” at the start of the paragraph, morphs into a “doctrine” in the 
middle of the paragraph, and comes to life as a “fundamental principle” by 
the end of the paragraph. But more importantly, compare what the Court in 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach actually said with the Northwest Austin’s 
Court representation of Katzenbach; the strikeouts indicate how the Court 
in Northwest Austin edited the portion it was quoting from South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach: “The doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South 
Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the 
terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies 
for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”248 Northwest Austin not 
only distorted the meaning of what the Court said in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach but also revived the equal dignity of the states that Katzenbach 
buried. By essentially rewriting the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court’s 
argument on equal sovereignty in Northwest Austin, Chief Justice Roberts 
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was able to use Northwest Austin to “bootstrap”249 the equal sovereignty 
argument into a viable legal argument. This then permitted him to accuse 
the dissent of ignoring the principle of equal sovereignty, not as understood 
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach of course, but as revived in Northwest 
Austin.  
Before Shelby County, we had a fairly strong grasp on the allocation of 
authority between the federal government and the states for regulating 
elections.250 While we knew that the Constitution delegated to the states 
authority for administering elections, we assumed, justifiably, that the 
scope of federal authority was fairly robust. In particular, when the federal 
government was regulating at the intersection of race and voting, it was 
operating within its zone of influence and was at the height of its powers. 
In this vein, we further assumed that the Reconstruction Amendments 
realigned the relationship between the federal government and the states. 
This was the lesson of the civil rights revolution.   
However, Shelby County has destabilized these assumptions. At root, 
the conservative justices understand the Civil Rights Era as sui generis, a 
moment in the nation’s history when abnormal conditions demanded a 
commensurate and abnormal response. The VRA distorted the proper 
relationship between the federal government and the states. This is why 
Chief Justice Roberts has repeatedly emphasized the “extraordinary” 
nature of the VRA and the “extraordinary” nature of the problem. These 
departures were justified in 1965 and 1966,251 from the Chief Justice’s 
perspective, because of the “extraordinary” nature of the problem, the 
Court permitted Congress and the VRA to “sharply depart[]” from “basic 
principles” of federalism and equal sovereignty.252 In 1965, the VRA 
divided the Nation between North and South.253 Recall here the Chief 
Justice’s question at oral argument as to whether “citizens in the South are 
more racist that citizens in the North?” Or recall Justice Kennedy’s 
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question with respect to whether Alabama is better off as “its . . . own 
independent sovereign or . . . under the trusteeship of the United States 
government?”254 As the Court read the history: 
It was in the South that slavery was upheld by law until 
uprooted by the Civil War, that the reign of Jim Crow denied 
African-Americans the most basic freedoms, and that state 
and local governments worked tirelessly to disenfranchise 
citizens on the basis of race. The Court invoked that 
history—rightly so—in sustaining the disparate coverage of 
the Voting Rights Act in 1966. But history did not end in 
1965.255  
Shelby County is a course correction. It aims to restore, from the 
perspective of the current Supreme Court majority, the proper balance 
between the federal government and the states by limiting congressional 
power exercised pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments. Quoting 
Gregory v. Ashcroft,256 which limited congressional power exercised under 
the Fourteenth Amendment against the state’s power to define the 
qualifications of its office holder, the Chief Justice remarked that “the 
Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as 
provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections.”257 
From this perspective the Reconstruction Amendments did not alter the 
balance between federal and state power, which was fixed by 1791, 
following the ratification of the Bill of Rights.  
But Shelby County is not simply about recalibrating the federal-state 
balance; the majority is after bigger game here. Shelby County is also about 
the redemption of the South.258 The Shelby County majority seeks to 
redeem the states and the South from the past.259 The majority sees voting 
rights law and policy as impermissibly backward-looking, too tied to the 
past, and insufficiently forward-looking. Justice Thomas gestured toward 
this point in his partial concurrence and partial dissent in Northwest Austin. 
“Punishment for long past sins,” he argued, “is not a legitimate basis for 
imposing a forward-looking preventative measure that has already served 
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its purpose.”260 Chief Justice Roberts later echoed this point in Shelby 
County. As he explained: 
The Fifteenth Amendment commands that the right to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged on account of race or color, 
and it gives Congress the power to enforce that command.  
The Amendment is not designed to punish for the past; its 
purpose is to ensure a better future. . . . To serve that purpose, 
Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those 
jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in 
light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past. 
We made that clear in Northwest Austin, and we make it clear 
again today.261 
In the same paragraph and quoting from Rice v. Cayetano,262 the case that 
struck down a provision of the Hawaii Constitution that limited voting for 
trustees for the Office of Hawaiian affairs to Hawaiians or native 
Hawaiians, the Court noted that “[c]onsistent with the design of the 
Constitution, the [Fifteenth] Amendment is cast in fundamental terms, 
terms transcending the particular controversy which was the immediate 
impetus for its enactment.”263 The next sentence in Rice v. Cayetano, which 
Chief Justice Roberts did not quote, provides:  “The Amendment grants 
protection to all persons, not just members of a particular race.”264 
If one listens carefully, one hears echoes of the Civil Rights Cases, 
particularly in the Court’s admonition that:  
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of 
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable 
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the 
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere 
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and 
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in 
the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are 
protected.265 
One is also reminded of Justice Scalia’s reproach in his concurring opinion 
in Adarand v. Pena266 “under our Constitution there can be no such thing as 
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either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s 
focus upon the individual . . . .”267 He went on to caution: 
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even for the 
most admirable and benign of purposes—is to reinforce and 
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that 
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the 
eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is 
American.268 
One is also reminded of Justice Scalia’s comment during oral argument in 
Shelby County where he characterized the VRA as a racial entitlement.269  
Or, to close the circle, consider this quote from the Chief Justice from 
Parents Involved in Community Schools: “The way to stop discrimination 
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”270  
The clear message from a majority of the Court in Shelby County is 
that the time has come to move on from the regulatory framework that 
characterized voting rights law, policy, and jurisprudence for the last half 
century. For the Court’s conservative majority, the regulatory framework is 
no longer au courant but passé. “Current conditions” and “current needs” 
is the persistent refrain of Shelby County. Racism, at least systematic 
racism in voting, is a thing of the past and therefore is not a justification for 
regulation. The South can no longer be tainted on the basis of its past 
history. The federal government can no longer assert broad powers on the 
basis of its past role as protector and defender of the voting rights for 
people of color or as enforcer of the Reconstruction Amendments. As 
Justice Thomas advised in Northwest Austin, the fact that the coverage-
preclearance regime is no longer necessary “is not a sign of defeat. It is an 
acknowledgement of victory.”271 As the majority would have it, it is time 
to withdraw the troops, declare victory, and go home. This is the end of the 
Second Reconstruction. 
V.  CONCLUSION: ON THE VOTING RIGHTS AMENDMENT ACT  
If the broader reading of Shelby County turns out to be the correct, 
Shelby County will limit the civil rights community’s attempt to restore the 
status quo ante Shelby. In many respects Shelby County has already done 
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so. Consider the Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014 (the “VRAA”) 
introduced by Representatives Jim Sensenbrenner and John Conyers in the 
House and Patrick Leahy in the Senate.272 The proposed legislation is a 
significantly scaled down version of the VRA and the old Section 4(a), 
which it is replacing. The new proposed coverage formula would apply to 
any state that committed five voting rights violations in the last fifteen 
years and has had “persistent and extremely low minority voter turnout.”273 
The VRAA defines a voting rights violation as a final judgment from a 
court concluding that the state has violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendment; or that the state has violated federal voting laws; or that the 
Attorney General has refused to pre-clear a proposed change, not including 
photo voter identification laws.274 The VRAA is proposed as a Shelby 
County fix but it is scaled so as not to overstep the constitutional 
boundaries laid down by Shelby County. 
Some voting rights activists have objected to the VRAA on policy 
grounds that it is too narrow and that it does not address modern voting 
rights problems, such as voter photo identification requirements. Unlike 
the old coverage formula, which applied to nine states275 and parts of seven 
other states,276 the new VRAA coverage formula would apply only to four 
states: Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.277 The VRAA does not 
cover states such as Ohio, Florida, and North Carolina that have been the 
site of recent voting rights controversies.278 Some Latino activists have also 
complained that the VRAA does not do enough to protect language 
minority groups.279 
The VRAA may not simply be inadequate as a matter of policy,280 if 
                                                                                                                          
272 H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 1945, 113th Cong. (2014); Press Release, Patrick Leahy, 
U.S. Sen. For Vt., Leahy, Sensenbrenner & Conyers Lead Bipartisan, Bicameral Introduction of 
Legislation to Restore the Voting Rights Act (Jan. 16, 2014), available at http://www.leahy.senate 
.gov/press/leahy-sensenbrenner-and-conyers-lead-bipartisan-bicameral-introduction-of-legislation-to-
restore-the-voting-rights-act. 
273 Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014).  
274 Id. at 6–7. 
275 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia 
(except for 17 counties and cities). JAMES A. GARDNER AND GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES, ELECTION LAW 
IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 279 (2012). 
276 Id. at 280. 
277 The Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014: Moving Forward On The VRAA, NAT’L ASSOC. 
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PERSONS: LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/case 
-issue/voting-rights-amendment-act-2014 (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). 
278 Id. 
279 See NALEO EDUCATIONAL FUND REP., LATINOS AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: PROTECTING 
OUR NATION’S DEMOCRACY THEN AND NOW 2, available at http://www.naleo.org/downloads/NALEO 
_VRA_Report_5.pdf (noting that the VRAA would only restore protections to about two thirds of the 
Latinos that were protected under the VRA).   
280 As we wrote in 2009, prior to Northwest Austin: 
 
 526 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:481 
one reads Shelby County broadly, certain parts of the VRAA are 
constitutionally vulnerable. Notwithstanding the attempt to draft a race-
based Shelby fix within the confines of Shelby County, as it turns out, this 
is a difficult task to accomplish when one is operating within the confines 
of a doctrine that is increasingly skeptical of the race-based approach. In 
order to write a statute that is in any way effective, the VRAA must at least 
skirt the constitutional lines laid down by Shelby County. For example, the 
VRAA amends Section 3(c) of the Act in order to make it easier to bail-in 
states and local subdivisions. Under the VRAA, a jurisdiction would be 
bailed-in not only when the jurisdiction engaged in voting discrimination 
that violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments—intentional 
discrimination under the current statute—but when a jurisdiction violates 
Section 2’s results, disparate impact, test.281  
But if Shelby County signals the majority’s intent to limit the scope of 
the VRA and, in this context, to limit the VRA’s scope to voting rights 
violations that are the consequence of intentional discrimination by state 
actors,282 the VRAA’s amended Section 3(c) may not only be struck down, 
but it will also have unnecessarily put Section 2 within the Court’s 
crosshairs. Similarly, the VRAA uses “persistent and extremely low 
minority voter turnout” as a trigger for determining which jurisdictions 
ought to be covered under a revised Section 4. However, if Shelby County 
is properly read as limiting the scope of Congressional intervention where 
Congress is enacting race-based voting legislation to eradicate systemic 
racism, a trigger that relies on persistent low turnout will not be rational in 
theory or practice.283 The persistently low turnout is not directly tied to 
identifiable racial discrimination. 
By any account, the VRAA is a modest intervention, in part because 
the highly partisan legislative process in Congress limits what is politically 
possible, but also in part because voting rights activists insist on framing 
the Shelby fix in race-based terms and thus must operate within the Court’s 
                                                                                                                          
If the high court now votes to invalidate the Voting Rights Act, Congress and the 
civil rights community would have an opportunity to engage in a much-needed 
debate on voting rights policy for a new century. Among the issues that could be 
debated are voter identification requirements and their potentially disparate racial 
impact, varying resources for voting machines and equipment, obstacles faced by 
Latinos in voting and political participation, and denial of the right to vote to 
thousands of ex-felons, many of whom are non-white. 
Guy-Uriel E. Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Golden Opportunity to Revamp the Voting Rights 
Act, L.A. TIMES (May 25, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/25/opinion/oe-charles25. 
281 See Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong., available at 
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/ uploadedfiles/vra_bill_text.pdf (interpreting the effect of the act with 
regard to disparate impact tests). 
282 See infra text accompanying notes 102–25. 
283 See infra text accompanying notes 216–19. 
 2014] STATE’S RIGHTS, LAST RITES, AND VOTING RIGHTS 527 
confining Shelby County paradigm. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
VRAA is a modest intervention, the VRAA is constitutionally vulnerable.  
Shelby County presents significant challenges for those advocating in 
favor of a race-based approach. Specifically, they will need to articulate a 
clear understanding of what constitutes racial discrimination in voting in 
the twenty-first century. Following the Court’s decision in Northwest 
Austin, where the Court declined to strike down Section 5 of the VRA, 
many in the civil rights community declared victory, notwithstanding the 
fact that the writing was then clearly on the wall. The assumption was that, 
notwithstanding the Court’s expressed skepticism, the conservative 
majority would not dare strike down the VRA. Voting rights activists dared 
the Court to blink. This time the Court did not blink and voting rights has 
suffered a significant setback. Shelby County presents an important 
opportunity for voting rights supporters to search for a better model that 
best represents the challenges faced by voters in the twenty-first century. 
The old consensus is no more; the past is gone. It is time to look forward 
toward the future.  
 
 
 
       
